When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly verso dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is a dog? We saw above that one possible response preciso Chrysippus’ paradox was esatto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not per dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is a dog, then, given the norma account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. In fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus a hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply esatto avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar chiazza. But the maximality principle may seem puro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark per unison? If a thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be trapu of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested per reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (con various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and sopra fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is per Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still mediante place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later to become definitely Dalmatians; some in verso day, some mediante verso second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary puro proclaim per Dalmatian part that is a split second away from becoming definitely a Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one verso day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems esatto favor one of the latter type according puro which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Durante any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own sicuro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus per hair is a dog – and a Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is verso multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark sopra unison mai more loudly than Oscar barks alone.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into a statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into verso ball and fashions a new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes per part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by verso new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Verso natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical puro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical preciso \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical to) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) login chappy is identical preciso \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical puro both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the canone account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants in quantified modal logic are esatto be handled exactly as they are sopra first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced esatto affirm that distinct physical objects ancora time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The standard account is thus davanti facie incompatible with the natural timore that constitution is identity.